WALTER - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

5/3/2013 4:23 PM

ANTITRUST AND CORPORATE LAW: REVISITING
THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
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ABSTRACT
This Article addresses the connection between antitrust law and the
market for corporate control. It argues that antitrust law should only seek
to regulate the market for corporate control when there is a problem of
competition that corporate law cannot fix on its own. The Article revisits
various suggested problems of competition in the market for corporate
control and argues that, in each case, there is no need for the involvement
of antitrust law. The Article then highlights one instance in the market for
corporate control where antitrust law is needed—and suggests a minor
change to enable it to do so better. The Article concludes that, by and
large, antitrust law is filling its correct role in the market for corporate
control.
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INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law and corporate law are generally seen as different beasts.
For over one hundred years, antitrust law has been “divorced” from
corporate law,1 and one scholar has called it “a stretch, and a big one” to
argue that antitrust law is part of corporate law.2 The two bodies of law are
taught and practiced differently. Large firms that deal with corporate
matters have dedicated and separate antitrust departments. A corporate law
class will only briefly touch upon certain topics in antitrust law, and an
antitrust course is more likely to cover economics than corporate law.3 The
separation between the two areas of law has “historical and professional”
roots.4 Corporate law came first; antitrust law only became a separate
discipline in the 1950s, a half-century after corporate law.5 And because
there has been a “pattern of oscillation” over the past 120 years whereby
the one body of law is strong at a time when the other is weak, academic
dialogue between the two disciplines has been rare.6
Despite—or perhaps because of—this supposed separation, academics
have argued that they should be linked.7 Antitrust law seeks to protect
competition in markets, and the market for corporate control is a market
like any other.8 Furthermore, it is important and valuable, worth trillions of

1. Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16, 27 (2008).
2. Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 245 (2002).
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 252, 449-50, 587-94 (4th ed. 2012) (two brief mentions of
competition law in addition to discussion of state takeover statutes); WILLIAM KLEIN ET AL.,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (7th ed. 2009) (leading corporations casebook which does not
mention antitrust at all); THOMAS MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN ANTITRUST
LAW AND ITS ORIGINS (4th ed. 2009) (no mention of the market for corporate control).
4. Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition Policy, 18 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 833, 842 (2011).
5. Id. at 842-43.
6. Id. at 850.
7. See infra note 10.
8. The Sherman Antitrust Act, the preeminent achievement in antitrust law, does not
mention “markets,” instead limiting itself to “trade” and “commerce.” See Sherman
Antitrust Act §§ 1-3, 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3, 6a (2006) (prohibiting the restraint of interstate
trade or commerce and prescribing penalties for violations). The scope of the Act was
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dollars each year.9 It would seem reasonable, therefore, that antitrust law
should ensure that the market for corporate control functions in a
competitive fashion.
The initial work in this field was done by Professor Edward Rock,10
and the views that Professor Rock expressed have been reanimated recently
by Thomas Piraino and Spencer Waller.11 But this area of law is not simply
of academic interest. Various court cases have dealt with the intersection
of antitrust laws and the market for corporate control.12 In a case currently
before the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
Dahl v. Bain Capital, a group of plaintiffs is seeking a remedy against a
group of private equity firms for violating section 1 of the Sherman Act in
allegedly colluding in leveraged buyout deals over the last decade.13 This
Article builds on the work of Rock and Piraino, to which it is indebted, but
suggests a different approach to resolving the question of tension between
antitrust law and the market for corporate control.
Three clarifying notes are in order here. First, references to antitrust
law in this Article are to federal antitrust law, unless otherwise noted.
Second, because of Delaware’s importance as a state of incorporation, I
generally focus on Delaware corporate law. Third, I take a broad, although
common, view of corporate law, and include under this heading, the
originally disputed: For example, one early decision ruled that the government did not have
the right to regulate intrastate manufacturing, as this was not classified as “commerce.”
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895). Since these early days, however,
the Court has held that the Sherman Act exists to preserve the smooth functioning of the
market. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) (“The
purpose of the Act is not to protect businesses from the working of the market; it is to
protect the public from the failure of the market.”).
9. See BLOOMBERG, 2012 M&A OUTLOOK 5 (Anita Khalili et al., 2011), available at
http://about.bloomberg.com/pdf/manda.pdf (reporting that over $2 trillion worth of deals
took place in 2011).
10. Edward B. Rock, Antitrust and the Market for Corporate Control., 77 CALIF. L.
REV. 1365 (1989) [hereinafter Rock, Corporate Control]; Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law
Through an Antitrust Lens, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 497 (1992) [hereinafter Rock, Antitrust
Lens].
11. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust Implications of “Going Private” and Other
Changes of Corporate Control, 49 B.C. L. REV. 971 (2008); Waller, supra note 4.
12. See, e.g., Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1990) (adjudicating a
case in which a shareholder brought suit against rival bidders for cooperating in their
bidding activities); Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 769 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1985)
(dealing with the question of antitrust violations in a tender offer bid).
13. Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Mass. 2008) (denying
the private equity firms’ motion to dismiss). The suit is still in progress, and, on account of
the editing schedule of this Article, I have not attempted to update this piece to take account
of all the latest developments. See, e.g., Peter Lattman & Eric Lichtblau, E-Mails Hint at
Collusion Among the Largest Equity Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2012, at B1 (discussing
developments in the case).
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Williams Act, a piece of federal securities regulation that has had a major
impact on the market for corporate control.
Part I of this Article traces the origins of antitrust and corporate law.
Part II discusses the potential for conflict between corporate and antitrust
law. It shows how courts have managed to resolve conflicts between the
two bodies of law in the past, and sets out a principle by which such
conflicts might be resolved. This principle is that corporate law should be
given the opportunity to resolve anticompetitive situations in the market for
corporate control on its own, and federal antitrust law should confine itself
to dealing with those anticompetitive situations that corporate law cannot
resolve. Part III explores three areas where it has been argued that antitrust
law should solve an anticompetitive situation in the market for corporate
control, and argues that in each instance, corporate law can resolve any
issues on its own. Therefore, corporate and antitrust law do not conflict in
these areas. Part IV discusses one area—mergers and acquisitions—in
which there is a problem of competition that corporate law cannot solve on
its own. It suggests that the antitrust legislative response in this area is
largely appropriate, and offers only a minor suggestion that would ensure
that the approach taken by antitrust law in this area does not conflict with
corporate law. In sum, this Article concludes that, insofar as the market for
corporate control is concerned, antitrust law is generally playing its proper
role.
I. ANTITRUST AND CORPORATE LAW SIDE-BY-SIDE
A. The Path of Federal Antitrust Law
Antitrust law can be traced back for over four hundred years.14
Modern antitrust law in the United States, however, begins with the
passage of the Sherman Act in 1890.15 Before the passage of the Sherman
Act, restraints existed on the excessive accumulation of capital—in state
law. Until the late 1880s, state corporate law prevented one company from

14. See Darcy v. Allein (The Case of Monopolies), (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1266
(K.B.) (holding that a patent granting a monopoly over the importation of playing cards into
England was “utterly void”). Common law courts first established a doctrine against
restraint of trade in Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B.). But questions of
competition were before the courts as early as the fifteenth century. See The Schoolmaster
Case, Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, fol. 47, pl. 19 (1410) (Eng.) (holding that it was lawful competition
for a schoolmaster to set up a new school in competition with an older school).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006).
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holding another company’s stock.16 This acted as a powerful restraint on
companies’ ability to buy competitors. Under the doctrine of ultra vires,
corporations were only permitted to carry out acts for which they had been
granted permission in their charter—and taking over other corporations was
not among them.17 Courts rationalized the doctrine of ultra vires on the
ground that an ultra vires contract, such as a takeover, worked “a diversion
of capital from the objects contemplated by the charter to the detriment of
non-assenting shareholders,” and was thus illegal.18
To evade the restrictions on cross-shareholdings, corporations began
to organize as trusts.19 Several states quickly recognized the intent behind
the new form, and Ohio and New York successfully sued to force the
dissolution of two of the largest entities—the Standard Oil and Sugar
Trusts.20 Frustrated by these efforts, industrialists (and their lawyers)
reconsidered how the corporate form could be made to serve their
purposes. What happened next was a critical moment in corporate and
antitrust law: New Jersey enacted a corporation law that permitted crossshareholdings.21
In response to this new law, a wave of trusts, including the Sugar
Trust, reincorporated in New Jersey.22 The state became so wealthy as a
result of incorporation and franchise fees that its entire budget was paid by
these corporation taxes alone.23 Other states attempted to copy New Jersey
by enacting their own cross-shareholding statutes, but had little success.
The ultra vires doctrine, which had acted as a restraint on monopolies, was
now dead. Because corporations could flow to any state that copied New
Jersey, the states could only revive the doctrine by acting together. But
such cooperation was impossible because the incentive for a state to cheat
was too high.24
Corporate law had kept a check on company size, but now failed to do
so. Congress recognized that the states were unwilling or unable to control
16. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory,
88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 191 (1985).
17. See Clyde L. Colson, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in United States Supreme Court
Decisions, 42 W. VA. L.Q. 179, 206 (1936) (noting that in cases dealing with ultra vires
contracts, the Supreme Court has followed the practice of declaring them void).
18. Id. at 206–07.
19. Horwitz, supra note 16, at 193.
20. Id. at 194.
21. Id. at 194–95.
22. Id. at 195.
23. Id. at 195.
24. Cheating or defecting on an agreement is a typical collective action problem and is
relevant to states as well as to individual actors and smaller entities. See generally Richard
E. Levy, Federalism and Collective Action, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1241 (1997) (explaining the
collective action problem of cheating faced by states).
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the trusts and therefore stepped in by enacting the Sherman Act. Section 1
of the Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations,” and section 2 prohibits acting, or
attempting to act, as a monopoly.25
Federal antitrust law has served many goals since the Sherman Act
was passed.26 At different points,27 the courts have evaluated business
practices (i) construing the Sherman Act literally and narrowly;28 (ii) under
a flexible “rule of reason” standard;29 (iii) under a rigid “per se” approach;30
and (iv) under an efficiency-driven “consumer welfare” standard,
championed by Robert Bork.31 Although the history of antitrust law does
not conveniently divide into exact periods, it is possible to identify some
general approaches to antitrust law that change over time.
In the first period of the application of the Sherman Act, the courts
were initially reluctant to strike down mergers—but not for reasons relating
to their construction of antitrust law itself. The first major case under the
Sherman Act was United States v. E.C. Knight Co., in which the Supreme
Court declined to enjoin the American Sugar Refining Company’s takeover
of four Philadelphia sugar refineries, which would give the company
“nearly complete control of the manufacture of refined sugar within the
United States.”32 The Court noted that the Sherman Act aimed at the
monopolization of “trade or commerce” but held that the contract to take
over the Philadelphia refineries was “an attempt to monopolize, or the
actual monopoly of . . . manufacture . . . .”33 Such behavior fell outside the
scope of the Sherman Act’s prohibition because Congress did not have the
power to regulate manufacturing under the Commerce Clause.34

25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006).
26. Id. §§ 1–7.
27. I present one common historical division of the periods of antitrust law, but this is
by no means the only one. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals,
53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 555–56 (2012) (demarcating the history of U.S. antitrust policy into
four separate “cycles”).
28. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895) (reading the
Sherman Act literally and narrowly).
29. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62, 66–68 (1911) (using
the “rule of reason” standard).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 217 (1940)
(using the “per se” approach).
31. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 51
(1978) (“The only legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization of
consumer welfare . . . .”).
32. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 9.
33. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 16–17.
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But the Court soon changed its views on the scope of both the
Commerce Clause and the Sherman Act. In Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, the Court carefully distinguished E.C. Knight Co. and held
that even though the act of manufacturing goods did not affect interstate
commerce, an agreement to sell such manufactured goods did.35 This
holding was overruled in Swift & Co. v. United States, in which the Court
adopted a theory of a “current of commerce” between the states, which the
government had the power to regulate.36 This decision made clear the
course for a much more expansive interpretation of the Sherman Act,
covering the activities associated with interstate commerce today.
At the same time, however, the Court changed its literal interpretation
of the phrase “every contract . . . in restraint of trade” in section 1 of the
Sherman Act. In Northern Securities Co. v. United States, the Court ruled
that mergers between railroad holding companies did qualify as interstate
commerce.37 The particularly important opinion in this case was that of
Justice Brewer, who provided a concurring fifth vote in support of
enjoining the merger between the Great Northern Railway Company of
Minnesota and the Northern Pacific Railway Company of Wisconsin. The
four Justices in the plurality believed that the Sherman Act should be
construed literally and that “every contract, . . . in whatever form, of
whatever nature, and whoever may be parties to it, . . . in restraint of trade”
should be enjoined.38 Brewer, on the other hand, considered that the
Sherman Act only reached “unreasonable” restraints of interstate
commerce, but that this combination was unreasonable.39 The dissenters,
led by Justice Holmes, essentially agreed with Brewer that the
“reasonableness” standard should be applied, but disagreed with the
outcome. Holmes argued that the Sherman Act was of a “very sweeping
and general character,” and only covered restraints on trade that would be
invalid at common law.40 The theory of Brewer and the dissenters finally
prevailed seven years later in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, in which
the Court adopted the “rule of reason” approach to antitrust, whereby only
“unreasonable” restraints on trade were prohibited.41
The period between 1890 and 1911 thus laid the groundwork for a
market-based approach to antitrust. The courts would look at the effect of
completed or proposed transactions on the market; they would not

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 240 (1899).
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398–99 (1905).
N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 354 (1904).
Id. at 331 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
Id. at 361.
Id. at 402 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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automatically invalidate particular kinds of transactions. This was not an
inevitable result. In Northern Securities, the Court could have adopted a
formalistic approach, under which a combination through a holding
company, rather than a direct combination of corporate interests, would be
considered immune from attack under the antitrust laws. But the lower
court refused to do so, observing that “the law . . . looks always at the
substance of things . . . rather than upon the particular devices or means by
which [a transaction] has been accomplished,”42 and the Supreme Court
agreed.43 The decisions in E.C. Knight and Addyston Pipe, predating
Northern Securities, have been interpreted as encouraging corporations to
enter into mergers rather than cartels: Manufacturing was initially not
covered by the Sherman Act, whereas price-fixing certainly was.44 But the
weight of the evidence is against this assertion, and whatever truth there is
in it,45 it was clear by 1911 that the Court was generally concerned not with
the structure of transactions, but their substance.46
The “rule of reason” approach to antitrust law held sway until about
1940. Soon after the Court endorsed this approach, Congress in 1914
enacted the Clayton Act in order to “reach conduct that did not rise to the
level of a Sherman Act violation.”47 The Clayton Act covers potentially
anticompetitive behavior such as price discrimination,48 tying
arrangements,49 stock acquisitions,50 and interlocking directorates.51
Instead of regulating the market as a whole, like the Sherman Act, the

42. United States v. N. Sec. Co., 120 F. 721, 726 (C.C. D. Minn. 1903).
43. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332 (1904).
44. George Bittlingmayer, Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?, 28
J.L. & ECON. 77, 86–89, 97 (1985); Tony Freyer, The Sherman Antitrust Act, Comparative
Business Structure, and the Rule of Reason: America and Great Britain, 1880–1920, 74
IOWA L. REV. 991, 1006–07 (1989).
45. Donald J. Smythe, The Supreme Court and the Trusts: Antitrust and the
Foundations of Modern American Business Regulation from Knight to Swift, 39 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 85, 95 (2005).
46. The case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. is an example of
this. The Dr. Miles Court struck down a vertical price maintenance agreement as against the
rule of reason, noting that it was in “restrain[t of] trade” and “injurious to the public
interest . . . .” 220 U.S. 373, 400, 409 (1911). The Court applied the same logic that had
animated its previous cases, such as Addyston Pipe, and did not place weight on the precise
form of the restraint. See, e.g., id. at 409 (“The complainant’s plan falls within the principle
which condemns contracts of this class. It, in effect, creates a combination for the prohibited
purposes.”) (emphasis added).
47. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53; Milton
Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 930, 945 (1962).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2006).
49. Id. § 14.
50. Id. § 18.
51. Id. § 19.
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Clayton Act seeks to regulate specific conduct engaged in by corporate
entities.52 In the future, for example, boards of competing corporations
could not share directors, regardless of whether or not such sharing would
be deemed reasonable by a court.53 The market-based approach of the
Sherman Act, on the one hand, and the transaction- or firm-based approach
of the Clayton Act, on the other, were complementary. Indeed, the Clayton
Act was designed to fill gaps in the Sherman Act’s system of market
regulation.54
Even though the “rule of reason” period is generally considered to last
up to 1940 or well beyond, it quickly began to show cracks.55 In the 1927
case of United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., the Court ruled that even
though a suspect business practice—here, price-fixing—might pass muster
under the rule of reason now, there was no guarantee that it would do so in
the future.56 Therefore, in some situations, it might be necessary for the
Court to hold that a certain practice was automatically illegal. The Court
held:
The reasonable price fixed today may through economic and
business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow.
Once established, it may be maintained unchanged because of the
absence of competition secured by the agreement for a price
reasonable when fixed. Agreements which create such potential
power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or
unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry
whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as

52. Not all of the Clayton Act was transaction-based. For example, section 6 of the
Act exempted labor unions from the scope of the act. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006) (“The labor of
a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce . . . .”).
53. A court must still determine that the corporations whose directors are being shared
are competitors, which is not necessarily an easy analysis. See Benjamin M. Gerber,
Enabling Interlock Benefits While Preventing Anticompetitive Harm: Toward an Optimal
Definition of Competitors Under Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 107, 118
(2007) (explaining that the ambiguity surrounding the definition of “competitors” results
from infrequent litigation on the issue).
54. The Senate Report on the Clayton Act stated that: “It is not proposed by the bill or
amendments to alter, amend, or change in any respect the original Sherman Antitrust Act of
July 2, 1890. The purpose is only to supplement that act and the other antitrust acts referred
to in section 1 of the bill.” S. REP. NO. 63-698, at 1 (1914). The act was also intended to
supplement various state laws. See, e.g., H. REP. NO. 63-627, at 9 (1914) (listing state laws
on price discrimination).
55. Compare THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN ANTITRUST
LAW AND ITS ORIGINS 118–230 (4th ed. 2009) (describing the rule of reason period as
lasting until 1940), with Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 263, 279–85 (describing the rule of reason period as a middle period lasting until 1965).
56. 273 U.S. 392, 396–97 (1927).
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fixed . . . .57
Trenton Potteries was an early harbinger of the “per se” period of
antitrust enforcement. The “per se” period is so called because, during this
period, certain types of activity were ruled illegal in and of themselves.
These activities included price-fixing (again),58 group boycotts,59
geographic divisions of territory,60 and monopolization.61 However, not
every potentially anticompetitive activity was considered per se illegal, and
the Court had difficulty at times determining what should be per se illegal
and what should not.62
In doing so, courts sought to regulate the market by proscribing
certain kinds of transactions. Congress also took a transaction-based
approach in its antitrust legislation. The Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950
prevented firms from escaping the requirements of the Clayton Act by
acquiring all of the assets, rather than the stock, of another company. This
act, like the Clayton Act, sought to govern the behavior of corporations
directly.63
The “per se” period is usually considered to last until the 1970s, when
the Court decided Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania.64 But, the courts did
not wholly disregard the market-based approach to antitrust in this time.

57. Id. at 397.
58. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
59. Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 312 U.S. 457, 464
(1941).
60. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951).
61. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
62. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967) (declaring
that vertical territorial restrictions on resales imposed by a manufacturer on a distributor
were per se illegal), overruled by Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58
(1977).
63. Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18). The Celler-Kefauver Act closed the “assets loophole” of the
Clayton Act: Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as originally drafted, prevented one corporation
from acquiring “the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to
substantially lessen competition . . . .” Antitrust Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 730, 731. As a result,
it was possible for corporations instead to acquire all the assets of other corporations, and
avoid the antitrust restriction. The judiciary acquiesced in the executive’s interpretation and
enforcement of Celler-Kefauver. In United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., for example, the
Court held that the acquisition by one Los Angeles grocery retailer of the assets of another
L.A. grocery retailer violated Celler-Kefauver. United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384
U.S. 270 (1966). Justice Stewart dissented, writing that “[t]he sole consistency that I can
find is that in litigation under [Celler-Kefauver] the Government always wins.” Id. at 301
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
64. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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This period is also known for its focus on market structure,65 and courts
would enjoin supposedly anticompetitive practices because the perpetrators
possessed too much market power, rather than because there was strong
evidence of anticompetitive conduct.66 The market-based and transactionbased approaches of antitrust law thus complemented each other.
And, to some extent, they bled into each other. “Per se” rules became
increasingly rare, as courts looked harder at whether certain practices really
should be enjoined. Often, courts would analyze the market effect of the
allegedly anticompetitive practice before applying the per se rule to a
practice that had already been held to be per se anticompetivie practice—
which thereby rendered the rule in effect not a per se rule at all.67 Courts
also sought to adopt a more sophisticated approach than the “rule of
reason” standard. They frequently resorted to Robert Bork’s “consumer
welfare” formulation, according to which the goal of antitrust law was to
“improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so
greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare.”68
About the time Bork introduced this famous principle, Congress
enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976
(HSR).69 This act came at the end of what has been termed a “Golden Age”
of antitrust enforcement.70 One of the authors of HSR, Senator Phil Hart,
sponsored the “Industrial Reorganization Act,” which would grant a
regulatory tribunal the power to “deconcentrat[e]” specific industries.71 He
proposed an amendment of the Sherman Act that would have prohibited
65. See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890-1955,
94 MINN. L. REV. 311, 355–56 (2009) (explaining the market-based approach to antitrust
law taken by the courts during the relevant time period).
66. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 448 (reversing judgment of lower court
dismissing complaint of monopolistic practices).
67. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 19 (1984)
(explaining the evolving approach to the application of the per se rule). In the same year as
publishing the Article, Easterbrook successfully argued before the Supreme Court Jefferson
Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, where the Court declined to overturn its
longstanding holding that tying arrangements were illegal per se, but modified its holding so
that any inquiry into their “per se condemnation” must be based on a finding that there was
market-forcing. 466 U.S. 2, 15–16 (1984). As four concurring Justices pointed out, this
was akin to analyzing tying arrangements under a rule of reason standard. Id. at 34–35
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
68. BORK, supra note 31, at 91; see also Stucke, supra note 27, at 574 (discussing the
adoption of this standard by courts).
69. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90
Stat. 1383 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 18a).
70. Joe Sims & Deborah P. Harman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino
on Merger Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences Applied to
Antitrust Litigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 872 (1997).
71. Id. at 873.
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monopoly possession, regardless of the manner of acquisition.72
Nevertheless, HSR—as it was enacted—was only intended to make a
modest change to the existing regime of federal antitrust regulation. The
act created a system of premerger review for the “very largest corporate
mergers,”73 as well as giving states the right to sue for antitrust violations
on behalf of their citizens,74 and granting the Department of Justice the
power to undertake civil antitrust investigations.75 Insofar as HSR was
intended to affect the market for corporate control, it has been described as
“modest medicine for a modest problem.”76
In sum, federal antitrust law has grown incrementally, and somewhat
inconsistently, since the Sherman Act was passed over 120 years ago. The
courts have interpreted the Sherman Act to regulate the market as a whole,
and as part of this regulation, they have also prohibited specific kinds of
transactions by individual firms. Congress has passed legislation with a
focus on both the market and transactions. With this foundation, I now
move on to corporate law.
B. The Path of Corporate Law
Corporate law is, of course, older than federal antitrust law. But
before the nineteenth century, its most salient feature was its rarity.
Corporations (in the modern commercial sense) were scarce, and those that
did exist were chartered specially.77 As a result of these special charters, up
to the 1830s a corporate charter was taken to imply a grant of monopoly
privileges.78
In the nineteenth century, the scope of corporate law became
increasingly narrow, and focused on the rights and duties of managers and
shareholders. Competition and utility regulation were seen as separate
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1373, at 11 (1976).
15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h (2006).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (2006).
Sims & Harman, supra note 70, at 878.
ROBERT E. WRIGHT, CORPORATION NATION: RISE AND DEMISE OF THE AMERICAN
ECONOMIC JUGGERNAUT (forthcoming 2013); see also id. at ch. 8 (explaining that, with few
exceptions, general incorporation laws were only enacted after the turn of the nineteenth
century).
78. This implied monopoly ended with the case of Proprietors of the Charles River
Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren River Bridge, in which the Court held, “The
complainants’ charter has been called a monopoly; but in no just sense can it be so
considered.” 36 U.S. 420, 567 (1837). See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 109–39 (1977) (discussing the state’s
power to charter monopolies, with particular reference to Charles River Bridge).
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areas outside corporate law’s purview.79 As corporate law became
increasingly specialized, there was also a shift in the nature of the voting
rights in the corporation. Many corporations in the nineteenth century—in
particular, turnpikes, canals, railroads, banks, and insurance companies—
had regressive voting structures, whereby the voting rights of large
shareholders were limited. The different explanations that have been
offered for this phenomenon include a desire to grant small shareholders
protection, which they would not otherwise have,80 and a “democratic”
rather than “plutocratic” conception of the corporation.81
These regressive voting structures largely died out by the twentieth
century, and voting rights were henceforth more closely tied to economic
rights.82 By this time, the idea that corporations should be managed
primarily for the benefit of their shareholders (the “shareholder primacy”
view) was commonplace.83 Nevertheless, many states have enacted
“constituency statutes” providing that, either in the general course of
business or in specific takeover situations, the corporation must be
managed with general community interests in mind.84 Delaware has not,
although the Delaware Supreme Court suggested that boards may take the
interests of “the community generally” in determining whether to take
defensive measures against takeover bids.85 But despite the “ad nauseam”
debate on the proper goals of corporate governance,86 it is true to say that
the corporation is managed primarily for the interests of its shareholders.87

79. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937 126, 243
(1991) (explaining the narrow scope of early corporate law).
80. See Eric Hilt, When Did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate
Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century, 68 J. ECON. HISTORY 645, 660 (2008) (“One
might imagine that the charters of firms in these industries were designed to attract the
participation of small shareholders by offering them some measure of protection from
dominance by large shareholders.”).
81. Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the
History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1354–56 (2006).
82. See, e.g., id. at 1358 (“The change came in the middle decades of the [nineteenth]
century when the voting rights of American shareholders shifted decisively toward
plutocracy.”).
83. See generally D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L.
277 (1988) (discussing the origin of the view that corporations should be managed for the
benefit of the shareholders).
84. See generally Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow
Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85 (1999) (surveying different corporate
constituency statutes).
85. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
86. See generally Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory
of Values and Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 651 (2004) (outlining the debate
over the proper goals of corporate governance).
87. One piece of evidence for this is that universally, it is shareholders, and not any
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We can thus describe American corporate law as consciously “firmfocused,” in that it looks at the relations that bind the firm, rather than the
corporation’s place in the wider market.88 Apart from in certain situations
where community interests are implicated, corporate law is concerned with
the relations of managers, shareholders, and (where relevant) creditors.
Importantly, corporate law does not aim at regulating whole markets. A
court will scrutinize a transaction to determine whether the directors have
breached a duty to shareholders, not to analyze its wider impact on the
market for corporate control.89
As noted, I take a broad view of corporate law in this Article, and
include in it key features of securities regulation that affect corporate
governance. Federal securities regulation begins with the Securities Act of
193390 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.91 The 1933 Act aimed to
improve the market in securities by adopting disclosure-based reporting
requirements for issuers of securities,92 and the 1934 Act regulates the
secondary trading of those securities.93 For the purposes of this Article, the
key piece of securities regulation that I will consider as corporate law is the
Williams Act of 1968, which regulates the tender offer process.94 The
Williams Act was the congressional response to coercive tender offers,
other group, who have the power to elect directors. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
8.03(c) (2010) (providing that directors are elected at the annual shareholders’ meeting).
Although this may be taken for granted in the United States, other countries permit
nonshareholder constituencies to be involved in electing directors and board members. See,
e.g., Ángel R. Orquendo, Breaking on Through to the Other Side: Understanding
Continental European Corporate Governance, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 975, 980–81
(2001) (discussing the structure of German boards).
88. In describing American corporate law as “firm-focused,” I do not mean to argue
that the managers of a corporation owe duties to the corporation, rather than the
shareholders. In this context, I am contrasting corporate law’s focus on the corporation
alone with the possibility that it might look to the broader market.
89. In this regard, American corporate law may be contrasted with British corporate
law, which appears more interested in maintaining a fluid market in corporate control. For
example, litigation in U.K. hostile takeovers is very rare, and the cost of a hostile bid is
much cheaper. See John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile
Takeovers, and Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95
GEO. L.J. 1727, 1745-52 (2007) (contrasting the focuses of American corporate law with
those of British corporate law).
90. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–aa (2006).
91. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006).
92. See, e.g., THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2[3][A],
at 22 (rev. 5th ed. 2006) (“The theory behind [the regulatory framework of the Securities
Act] is that investors are adequately protected if all relevant aspects of the securities being
marketed are fully and fairly disclosed.”).
93. See id. § 1.2[3][A], at 23 (“The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is directed at
regulating all aspects of public trading of securities.”).
94. Williams Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2006).
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under which offerors were able to force shareholders into rushing to tender,
sometimes on the basis of misinformation.95 Although the Act has had a
major impact on the market for corporate control, it has a transaction-based
approach: It governs the process by which firms may make and accept
tender offers. Apart from setting out the rules for tender offers, the Act
sought to be “neutral” and not to favor bidders or target shareholders.96
Broadly conceived, corporate law thus has a transaction- or firm-based
approach.
II. CONFLICTS BETWEEN CORPORATE LAW AND ANTITRUST LAW
A. The Nature of the Conflict
Antitrust law, as we have seen, seeks to regulate the market, and
blends a transaction-focused approach with a market-oriented approach.
Certain transaction-based elements of antitrust law have the potential to
clash with corporate law, whose firm-based approach governs whether
corporations are permitted to engage in particular transactions, and does not
regulate the market as a whole. It is not hard to see the potential for tension
between corporate and antitrust law. To use a basic example of
anticompetitive behavior that antitrust law prohibits, a firm may be able to
obtain higher profits if it engages in horizontal price-fixing with another
firm. These higher profits may lead to higher returns to shareholders, and
therefore, corporate directors and officers might be tempted to engage in it.
But antitrust law enjoins such price-fixing per se.97 The interests of the
public at large trump the interests of the shareholders of the firm.98
There could, of course, be a perfect overlap between the class of
shareholders and class of customers of a firm.99 In such a situation,
corporate law and antitrust law could not be in conflict: Maximizing
shareholder value would be no different from maximizing “consumer
welfare,” for all the consumers would be shareholders. In the market for
95. William C. Tyson, The Proper Relationship Between Federal and State Law in the
Regulation of Tender Offers, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 241, 249–53 (1990) (explaining the
purpose of the Williams Act was to eliminate tender offer abuses).
96. Id. at 252.
97. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (“Agreements
which create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or
unlawful restraints . . . .”).
98. See id. (“[T]he public interest is best protected from the evils of monopoly and
price control by the maintenance of competition.”) (emphasis added).
99. This was the historical operation of some corporations, such as insurance
companies founded to serve their local market.
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corporate control, the consumers whose “welfare” is to be “maximized” are
shareholders. Insofar as this market is concerned, we should expect
corporate and antitrust law to be well-aligned.
There are reasons to be skeptical about this alignment. Most corporate
law, with the exception of securities regulation, is state law. The most
important antitrust legislation, on the other hand, is federal law. Therefore,
two different sets of institutions—state and federal—are responsible for
producing law that maximizes shareholder value. If only one of these errs,
or has a different notion of what constitutes “consumer welfare” or
“shareholder value,” antitrust law and corporate law could be in conflict.
Furthermore, when antitrust law seeks to regulate at the level of the firm—
as opposed to the market—there is a higher risk of a conflict with corporate
law, which also regulates firms.
To be sure, conflicts are not necessarily problematic. Antitrust law
can conflict with many areas of law, and courts can resolve these tensions.
The doctrine of intra-enterprise conspiracy is one such example. Until
1984, it was theoretically possible for a parent corporation to be held liable
for conspiring with its wholly-owned subsidiary.100 The effect of this was
to encourage corporations to merge subsidiaries into themselves and
operate them as divisions. Antitrust law thus took a firm-based approach
that conflicted squarely with the firm-based approach of corporate law:
The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine affected the structure of
corporations, and made it less desirable for a parent company to spin out a
division, as it might be held liable for conspiracy.101 But, in 1984, the
Supreme Court repudiated the doctrine, stating that “the coordinated
activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that
of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act.”102 Corporate
law is still free to treat parents and subsidiaries as being able to conspire
with one another, which is fitting, as they have “presumptively separate
legal dignities.”103 Thus, corporate law has free rein, without interference
from antitrust law.
Another conflict that has been resolved—at least partially—is the use
of antitrust derivative suits to obstruct takeovers.104 The idea is simple: If
100. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (finding the very
idea of an agreement between a parent and subsidiary to be meaningless).
101. See Phillip Areeda, Intraenterprise Conspiracy in Decline, 97 HARV. L. REV. 451,
453–54 (1983) (discussing the history of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine).
102. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771.
103. Allied Capital Corp. v. G-C Sun Holdings, L.P., 910 A.2d 1020, 1039 (Del. Ch.
2006). But see In re Transamerica Airlines, Inc., No. Civ. A. 1039-N, 2006 WL 587846, at
*7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2006) (holding “the general principle that a corporate parent and its
wholly-owned subsidiary cannot conspire together to be controlling”).
104. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender
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the target company is in the same business as the acquirer, it may seek to
enjoin the takeover on the grounds that the takeover will reduce
competition in the business. The target may demand injunctive relief under
section 16 of the Clayton Act because the merger would violate section 7 of
the Act.105 This strategy is of most use in the case of horizontal mergers,
though it can also be used in instances of vertical integration. Such actions
are anomalous, because what they allow, in effect, is for the company to
assert rights that would traditionally belong to the persons that are harmed
by the antitrust violation.106 The target company and its shareholders are
not victims of the antitrust injury; rather, the target’s shareholders profit by
the alleged violation, assuming that the acquiring company pays a premium
for the merger. Therefore, the purpose of antitrust derivative suits in such a
situation is solely to obstruct a takeover, not to remedy a harm suffered by
the plaintiff. Because of the lack of “antitrust standing” in such a situation,
many courts have blocked the use of such actions, which has resolved the
conflict.107
B. Resolving Conflicts Between Corporate and Antitrust Law
Nevertheless, the potential for conflicts between antitrust law and
corporate law remains. These conflicts are inefficient and socially
wasteful: Directors and managers of organizations are forced to try to
abide by contradictory rules. This Article proposes a way of resolving
these conflicts: Antitrust law should only step in to solve a problem of
competition in the market for corporate control when the existing modes of

Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155 (1982) (detailing potential defensive strategies in the case of
a takeover).
105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 26 (2006). Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides that “[n]o
person . . . shall acquire . . . the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital . . .
where . . . the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U.S.C. § 18.
106. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 104, at 1156; cf. supra note 74 and
accompanying text (noting the provision of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act that gave states
standing to sue).
107. Despite the criticism of such suits, see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 104, the
Second Circuit permitted such an action to proceed in Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v.
Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989). The court noted that the antitrust laws were
enacted for the “protection of competition, not competitors,” and thus permitted the suit to
proceed. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC, 871 F.2d at 257 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)). Other courts have expressly criticized this result.
See, e.g., Anago, Inc. v. Tecnol Med. Prods., Inc., 976 F.2d 248, 250 (5th Cir. 1992)
(declining to follow Gold Fields and instead “adher[ing] to the line of cases . . . that require
antitrust injury” in order to possess standing to sue for injunctive relief).
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governance for that market—state corporate law, together with federal
securities regulation—are incapable of resolving the problem on their own.
This principle is, in part, common sense. Having two bodies of law
regulate one area increases the risk of inconsistent regulatory schemes and
modes of governance, and therefore, this should be avoided. Courts and
scholars may find ways of resolving these inconsistencies—for example,
by holding that one body of law preempts the other.108 Nevertheless, it is
undoubtedly true that overlapping regulatory schemes creates the
possibility of inconsistent regulation.
But the principle also has a broader policy foundation, which is the
view that the current system of state corporate law, supported by federal
securities regulation, is successful. Although there is certainly a role for
federal regulation in corporate law, as under the current system, we should
be wary before increasing federal oversight of the market for corporate
control when state systems of corporate governance have historically been
successful.109 The acceptance by the judiciary of the view that corporate
governance should be left to the states was most definitively expressed in
1977 in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, where the Court ruled that a
federal action, under Rule 10b-5, could not be used to obtain redress for an
alleged breach of corporate law fiduciary duty.110 The Court noted that
permitting Rule 10b-5 to be used in this way “would . . . bring within the
Rule a wide variety of corporate conduct traditionally left to state
regulation.”111 The D.C. Circuit echoed this reasoning in the 1990 case of
Business Roundtable v. SEC, where the court struck down a new corporate
voting regulation on the grounds that it exceeded the SEC’s authority under
the Exchange Act and trespassed on “a part of corporate governance
traditionally left to the states.”112 Congress likely does have the power to
regulate every aspect of corporate governance, under the Commerce
108. See, e.g., Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007) (finding
that securities law precluded the application of antitrust law in a suit concerning initial
public offerings); Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824, 829 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding
that the antitrust laws were inconsistent with the securities law in a takeover case); Dahl v.
Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding that securities
law does not preempt antitrust law in going private transactions); Piraino, supra note 11, at
992 (arguing that Finnegan is no longer good law after Credit Suisse).
109. In fact, some scholars have argued that there need not even be a role for federal
securities regulation. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2401–12 (1998) (suggesting that
federal securities laws be made optional). For this Article, I simply suggest that there is
generally no further need for federal intervention in the market for corporate control in the
form of antitrust enforcement.
110. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
111. Id. at 479.
112. 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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Clause, but it has chosen not to. In the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, for example, Congress sought to prevent
shareholders from using state courts to bring securities class actions.113 At
the same time, however, it created a carve-out for claims that are based on
state law, and permitted these actions to continue in state courts.114 And
even in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Congress exempted
corporate lawsuits from the scope of the law.115
As a normative matter, the federalist structure of corporate law is
praised by some, though not all, academics. Scholars such as William Cary
and Lucian Bebchuk have argued that state corporate law is a “race to the
bottom,” with each state seeking to enact laws that are more and more promanagement in order to attract companies to their state.116 According to
this theory, all that can stop the continued deterioration in the quality of the
internal governance of corporations is federal intervention. This argument
has been rebutted by others who believe that state corporate law is, if
anything, a race (or “leisurely walk”) to the top, and that states compete to
improve their laws, not weaken them.117 This theory relies on the fact that
shareholders can choose where to incorporate new companies, and can
oblige a company to reincorporate in a different state if they would prefer it
to be governed by a different legal regime.
It is clear that the current system of corporate law provides meaningful
choice to shareholders. Delaware provides a system of corporate
governance based on what one scholar has called “director primacy”: The
directors manage the corporation for the benefit of the shareholders.118
North Dakota has taken (with limited success) the opposite approach,

113. Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2(2)-(5), 112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (1998).
114. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(d)(1)(B), 78bb(f)(1) (2006) (permitting certain state law claims
to continue in state courts).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(B) (2006) (exempting claims that relate to the internal
affairs or governance of corporations).
116. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (describing the deterioration of corporate law in
Delaware); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992) (analyzing the
nature of state charter competition).
117. The original proponent of this theory was Professor (and now Judge) Ralph Winter
in his article, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). His thesis was expanded upon and strengthened by Roberta
Romano. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); see also
Ralph K. Winter, The “Race for the Top” Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1526, 1529 (1989) (re-characterizing the “race to the top” as a “leisurely walk”).
118. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003).
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adopting a “shareholder-centric” corporation law.119 Nevada has followed
Delaware’s director-centered approach, and has adopted a statute that
significantly reduces the fiduciary duties owed by the directors of a firm to
its shareholders.120 And the arguments in favor of federalism in corporate
law have attracted considerable support over the last two decades, even
despite corporate fiascos such as the Enron debacle, which led to the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.121 Outside of the United States,
another group of jurisdictions that is able to mimic the American approach–
the European Union–has begun to do so.122 Scholars studying the European
market have come to assume the superiority of competitive federalism,123
business groups have lobbied for it,124 and the European Commission has
even studied the adoption of a regulation that would enshrine competitive
119. Christopher M. Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad
Approach to the Shareholder Bylaw Debate, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 24 n.116 (2011).
120. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Nevada and the Market for Corporate
Law, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1165 (2012) (detailing Nevada’s approach to corporate law).
121. For a summary of the debate, see Fenner Stewart, Jr., The Place of Corporate
Lawmaking in American Society, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 147, 155–65 (2010).
122. The European progression toward an American system of competition for charters
has been slow, but significant. In 1999, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that a
company that had incorporated itself in a jurisdiction in order to take advantage of that
jurisdiction’s low share capital requirements could not be prevented from carrying on all its
business in another jurisdiction. Case C-212/97, Centros v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen,
1999, E.C.R. I-1484. This reasoning was extended in Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v.
Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 2002, E.C.R. I-9943, which
held that a corporation incorporated in one jurisdiction could not be denied access to the
courts of another jurisdiction that was its only possible forum, and in Case C-167/01, Kamer
van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd, 2003, E.C.R. I-10195,
which held that a foreign corporation could not be subjected to different requirements from
domestic corporations. The “real seat” theory is still permitted under European law, which
acts as a restraint on a fluid market for charters. Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és
Szolgáltató bt, 2008, E.C.R. I-09641. However, more and more states are abandoning the
“real seat” theory in favor of the registration theory, and so it is possible that the European
market for incorporations may become fluid without any legislative or judicial action. See
Stefano Lombardo, Regulatory Competition in Company Law in the EU after Cartesio, 10
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 627, 637 (2009) (detailing the role of the registration theory in the
European market).
123. Lombardo, supra note 122 (arguing that shareholders should be able to change
easily the seats of incorporation of their companies); Andrzej W. Wiśniewski & Adam
Opalski, Companies’ Freedom of Establishment after the ECJ Cartesio Judgment, 10 EUR.
BUS. ORG. L. REV. 595, 621 (2009) (“[Cross-border conversion of corporate form] is a
useful supplement to the right to move their centre of administration, allowing them to more
freely select the most convenient legal system and stimulating competition between Member
States’ company law systems.”).
124. See EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INST., REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP
OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS ON A MODERN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY LAW IN
EUROPE (Nov. 4, 2002), available at http://www.ecgi.org/publications/documents/report_e
n.pdf (urging the Commission to propose legal changes to promote competitive federalism).
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federalism in European law.125
The conscious decision that the courts and Congress have made that
corporate governance should be the domain of the states, and the
advantages of that system from a policy perspective, provide support for
the notion that antitrust law should be confined to correcting problems in
the market for corporate control that state corporate law cannot fix. Where
state corporate law, working in conjunction with federal securities law,
cannot fix a problem, antitrust law should step in. This is largely how the
system operates. I return to the example at the beginning of this Part—that
of a corporation engaging in horizontal price-fixing.126 Corporate law has
nothing to say about horizontal price-fixing. It would be difficult for
corporate law, which focuses on wealth maximization, to say anything
about this. In theory, the directors and officers of a firm, given the
opportunity, might seek to engage in such conduct in order to maximize
shareholder value. But antitrust law prohibits this anticompetitive
conduct.127 Corporate law, relying on antitrust law, addresses this issue
indirectly: A willful breach of antitrust law would also constitute a breach
of a director’s duty of loyalty in corporate law.128 Thus, corporate law
effectively yields to antitrust law.
But when there is a problem that corporate law can solve, either on its
own or in conjunction with federal securities law, antitrust law need not be
involved. The next Part discusses how corporate law manages to resolve
issues in the market for corporate control.
III. CORPORATE LAW RESOLVING ISSUES ON ITS OWN
I now move to three areas where it has been suggested that the market
for corporate control is anticompetitive, and where it has been suggested
that federal antitrust law should step in to restore competition. Currently,
federal antitrust law does not operate in these areas. I argue that this is

125. See COMM’N OF EUROPEAN CMTYS., IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON THE DIRECTIVE ON THE
CROSS-BORDER TRANSFER OF REGISTERED OFFICE (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/in
ternal_market/company/docs/shareholders/ia_transfer_122007_part1_en.pdf (analyzing the
potential impact of cross-border transfer regulation).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 97–98.
127. United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (prohibiting horizontal
price-fixing).
128. See Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good
Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 652 (2010) (“[C]ourts . . . have had little
difficulty in concluding that directors breach their fiduciary duty when they knowingly
cause the corporation to violate the law and are responsible for any harm suffered by the
corporation as a result.”).
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desirable: There is no need for federal antitrust law to do so. Thus, federal
antitrust law and corporate law are working together as they should.
A. Tender Offers: Collusion Between Buyers
In his seminal 1989 article, Antitrust and the Market for Corporate
Control, Edward Rock argued that collusion in hostile tender offers should
be scrutinized under the antitrust laws in the same way as collusion in any
other market.129 The article was triggered by 1980s bidding battles in
which private equity firms had agreed to bid jointly for targets, rather than
against each other.130 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit endorsed this behavior in the 1985 case, Kalmanovitz v. G.
Heileman Brewing Co.131 In Kalmanovitz, two bidders for the Pabst
Brewing Company initially competed against each other to gain control of
the company, but then ceased competition and agreed to bid with each
other and divide the company’s assets.132 The Third Circuit held that
bidders for a company were permitted to collude in a tender offer auction,
since such behavior did not implicate “trade or commerce,” and so was not
covered by the Sherman Act.133
The Rock article noted that if the object of the bidding in Kalmanovitz
was not corporate stock, but goods or services, such collusion would be
illegal.134 This argument has been taken up more recently in an article by
another scholar and practitioner, Thomas Piraino, who has claimed that
collusion by bidders in “going private” transactions has lost shareholders
billions of dollars in the last few years.135 Piraino’s focus is on change-ofcontrol transactions in the private equity business: He argues that the small
number of firms in the industry has allowed private equity houses to “take
turns” in bidding for companies and thus reduce the price that they would
pay.136 As an alternative to taking turns, the private equity houses may also
form consortiums—or “clubs”—to bid for a target. This behavior prevents
the target from enjoying the benefit of multiple, competitive, bids.137
The argument concerning collusion in tender offers has two main

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Rock, Corporate Control, supra note 10.
Id. at 1368, 1402, 1411.
Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 769 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1985).
Id. at 157.
Id. at 156.
Rock, Corporate Control, supra note 10.
Piraino, supra note 11.
Id. at 973.
Id. at 978.
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prongs. First, it is claimed that bidders in tender offers explicitly collude
and refuse to compete against each other.138 This collusion can be seen as a
form of horizontal price-fixing, which is illegal per se.139 Second, it is
claimed that implicit collusion between private equity firms is rife: Even if
private equity bidders do not agree explicitly to collude in a bid, they are
able to signal to each other that they do not wish to bid against each
other.140 Such signaling is not illegal per se, but would still be illegal if it
had an anticompetitive effect.141 Both implicit and explicit collusion are at
issue in the ongoing litigation in federal district court, Dahl v. Bain Capital,
on alleged collusion between private equity firms in club deals.142
One proposed remedy to these perceived problems—and the remedy
sought in the lawsuit—is more stringent application of the federal antitrust
laws. According to this thinking, state corporate law and federal securities
laws are not equal to the task of correcting this anticompetitive behavior.
Under state corporate law, managers have a fiduciary duty to obtain the
best possible price for a corporation’s stock when a sale is inevitable.143
But, managers “can avoid the application of state fiduciary laws entirely
simply by proving that they made their best efforts to obtain the highest
available price in a change-of-control transaction.”144 Therefore, if private
equity firms collude in bidding, shareholders have no recourse against
management for failing to obtain a better price; managers cannot prevent
bidders from colluding, and their best efforts may come to naught. The
federal securities laws, on the other hand, force bidders to disclose any
agreements to bid jointly for a company, but do not prohibit joint bidding
arrangements.145 They therefore provide no remedy against collusive
138. Piraino, supra note 11, at 1001–04.
139. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (“The aim
and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one form of
competition.”).
140. Piraino, supra note 11, at 1004–11.
141. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); see also LAWRENCE A.
SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 240–
41 (2000) (stating that Gypsum’s analysis shows how price information exchanges should be
subject to the conventional antitrust analysis).
142. E.g., Third Amended Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 40–47, Dahl v. Bain Capital
Partners, LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Mass. 2008) (No. 07-12388-EFH), available at
2008 WL 5679238 (describing defendants’ scheme to collude, and citing the leveraged
buyouts of SunGard and Neiman Marcus Group as recent examples of defendants’ collusive
behavior).
143. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del.
1986).
144. Piraino, supra note 11, at 989; see, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d
235, 242 (Del. 2009) (“No court can tell directors exactly how to accomplish that goal [of
getting the best price in a sale].”).
145. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (2012); see also Piraino, supra note 11, at 990 (citing
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behavior, even if this behavior would be illegal under the Sherman Act.146
The argument above is not ironclad. The threshold problem is that it
is not clear that shareholders are being harmed through such allegedly
anticompetitive practices. One study that compared private deals and
public deals between 1990 and 2005 concluded that target company
shareholders received an acquisition premium that was forty-three percent
higher if a public firm rather than a private firm made the acquisition, and
fifty-five percent higher if a public firm rather than a private equity firm
makes the acquisition.147 But the conclusion drawn by the study
researchers was that public firms are overpaying—not that private equity
firms are underpaying.148 The explanation for this overpayment was that
publicly owned companies have diffuse ownership, and that managers thus
have less incentive to ensure that they do not overpay for targets.149 Other
research has shown that private equity firms are prone to overpaying for
firms as well as for underpaying for them, and also that private equity
buyouts create permanent economic value, which would help explain why
private equity investors can gain high returns on capital.150
But this threshold issue is not fatal for the argument that the market
for control does not suffer a problem of competition. Even if private equity
on balance adds significant value to firms, and target shareholders receive
fair prices for their stock, instances of collusion that reduce target
shareholder return in individual cases should still not be tolerated. For
example, the plaintiffs in the ongoing Dahl litigation in Massachusetts

Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824, 831 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he SEC . . . has ‘chosen
not to prohibit agreements between rival bidders as fraudulent or manipulative practices
once shareholders are properly informed of them.’”)).
146. Piraino, supra note 11, at 990.
147. Leonce Bargeron et al., Why Do Private Acquirers Pay So Little Compared to
Public Acquirers? 1, 22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13061, 2007);
Piraino, supra note 11, at 987 n. 111.
148. Bargeron et al., supra note 147, at 23.
149. Id.
150. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J.
ECON. PERSP. 121, 135 (2009) (“[I]t seems likely that at times in the boom-and-bust cycle,
private equity ﬁrms have overpaid in their leveraged buyouts and experienced losses.”).
Kaplan and Strömberg do acknowledge the Bargeron paper and other research that show
that “there is some evidence that private equity funds are able to acquire ﬁrms more cheaply
than other bidders.” Id. However, they note that there are various possible explanations for
this: Private equity firms may be exceptionally skillful negotiators, and private equity firms
are better than public firms are timing the market well, both on entering and exiting their
investment. These explanations are plausible, given that the business model of private
equity is to some extent predicated upon private equity fund managers being good
bargainers and knowing how to time the market. See also id. at 143 (“[P]rivate equity
creates economic value . . . . “).
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claim to identify up to thirty-six such transactions.151 And there are
certainly instances where bidders appear to have managed to collude to
avoid paying the price that they would pay if bidding against each other in
a competitive auction process.152 If shareholders are being harmed, then
corporate law and securities law have failed, and antitrust law may be the
only solution to prevent further harms.
But it is not inevitable that shareholders would be harmed by any of
the three practices that are condemned, namely, express collusion, tacit
collusion, and use of consortia. In theory, shareholders may be harmed by
receiving an offer price from a collusive bid that is lower than the price that
they would receive if the target were the subject of a competitive bidding
process. But shareholders retain the right to approve, or vote against, the
sale of the company. In a publicly owned corporation without a majority
shareholder, there is no single owner who can force a sale.153 If
shareholders know that one bidder is refusing to compete with another
bidder, or that two bidders have decided to form a consortium, the
shareholders have no obligation to sell the corporation at all, and they
might well choose not to. As noted above, the federal securities regulations
mandate disclosure of such bidding agreements;154 shareholders will be able
to make an informed choice.
This “informed choice” is not idle fantasy. Shareholders are, by and
large, not the uninformed and powerless individuals of the Berle and
Means corporation.155 Instead, individuals choose generally to invest
through intermediaries—institutional investors such as mutual funds and
pension funds.156 These institutional investors, by contrast, can agitate to
151. Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Mass. 2008).
152. Piraino, supra note 11, at 1003–04.
153. If there is a majority shareholder, that shareholder will always be able to force a
sale of the entire company, because it will be able to purchase the shares of the minority
through a “squeeze-out.” Since Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court held
that there was no business purpose requirement for such a transaction. 457 A.2d 701 (Del.
1983).
154. See supra note 145.
155. The “Berle and Means corporation” denotes a corporation whose stock is diffusely
owned by individuals. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 117 (1932). As a result of this diffuse ownership, all
economic power rests in the hands of the management. See, e.g., id. at 124 (“[I]t is
therefore evident that we are dealing not only with distinct but often with opposing groups,
ownership on the one side, control on the other—a control which tends to move further and
further away from ownership and ultimately to lie in the hands of the management itself, a
management capable of perpetuating its own position.”).
156. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW.
101, 114 (1979); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground?
Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of
Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 4–5 (2007).
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ensure that they achieve the best possible return on their investment. They
can either research and study stocks themselves, or they can canvass an
opinion from professional advisors who will tell them whether an offer
should be accepted or not.157 Delaware law places such faith in
shareholders’ ability to decide what is in their best interests that
conditioning an “interested” transaction on the approval of a group of
shareholders may help insulate that transaction from the most rigorous
form of judicial scrutiny.158
The ability of shareholders to refuse to sell their stock does not, on its
own, eliminate all harms that may arise from collusion between bidders.159
For example, shareholders may note that the offer they receive from the
colluding bidders is still higher than the pre-bid price of their stock, and
therefore choose to sell, even though the price they receive is not as high as
it would be if there had been no collusion between bidders. The harm to
shareholders in this case is not receiving the premium that they would have
obtained had there been no collusion.
Nevertheless, it appears that corporate law already has a remedy for
this problem. Under the Revlon doctrine, a corporation’s board must make
an effort to obtain the highest possible price for the corporation’s shares,
when a change of control is inevitable.160 If the board, or its financial
advisor, believes that a club deal will depress the price obtained for the
shares, the board may choose not to permit such deals.161 The management
may also prevent bidders from sharing information more generally.162 If
shareholders who are faced with a deal believe that the management and
directors have improperly permitted collusion between bidders, and have

157. Strine, supra note 156, at 8; see also Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of
Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1874 (2008) (describing the role
of Institutional Shareholder Services in advising institutional investors how they should
vote).
158. See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 643–44 (Del. Ch.
2005) (advocating a standard of review for “going private” mergers whereby, if the deal was
negotiated by an independent special committee and conditioned on the approval of a
majority of the disinterested shareholders, the transaction would be reviewed under the
deferential “business judgment” rule).
159. As will be discussed below, see infra section II.B, this remedy has itself been
attacked on the grounds that it raises antitrust problems: Shareholders are colluding with
each other and distorting the market. I argue below that such a remedy would be
procompetitive, not anticompetitive, and so presents no problems of antitrust law.
160. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del.
1986).
161. See, e.g., In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 821 (2011)
(discussing a “no teaming” provision that allowed the board to “determine whether any
bidders would be allowed to work together on a joint bid”).
162. E.g., id.
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not obtained the best price, they can sue under Revlon for equitable relief,
and may later seek damages.163 They may also sue the allegedly collusive
bidders for aiding and abetting the directors’ purported breach of fiduciary
duty.164 Therefore, corporate law seems to have a mechanism to prevent,
and remedy, any harm shareholders may suffer. To be sure, antitrust law
can provide a strong deterrent, including triple damages and criminal
liability.165 But, corporate law is not without its own remedy.
The case of tacit collusion, on the other hand, is more problematic. In
such cases, shareholders are not given all the information they need to
decide whether or not to accept the bid. Furthermore, even if management
seeks to prevent bidders from communicating with each other, the bidders
may disregard such instructions. But, such behavior is already a breach of
the federal securities laws: Information about the collusion is not being
disclosed to shareholders.166 Shareholders possess a private right of action
for a failure to disclose such information, and of course the SEC can
enforce the securities law also.167 Therefore, there does not seem to be any
need for federal antitrust law to make any special provision to deal with
tender offers.
B. Tender Offers: Collusion Between Sellers
Tender offers have also been criticized on antitrust grounds because of
the potential for collusion between sellers. In a tender offer, the bidder
seeks to gain more than fifty percent of the shares of the target company;
once this is done, the bidder will be able to buy the remainder of the shares,
whether or not the sellers agree.168 This has the potential to create a
“shareholders’ dilemma.”169 If all the shareholders cooperate with each
163. See, e.g., In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 208 (Del. Ch.
2007) (discussing injunctive relief and damages under Revlon).
164. See, e.g., Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 836-37 (noting that a bidder may be liable for
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty by the board).
165. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (providing for criminal liability for cartelization); id. §
15(a) (2006) (providing for triple damages for violations of the antitrust laws).
166. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2006).
167. See, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 92, § 11.10, at 436-39 (discussing private rights of
action under section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
168. The bidder may do this in two ways. If the bidder has fifty percent of the stock of
the company that it wishes to acquire, it can merge the target company into a wholly-owned
subsidiary. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2013). If the bidder has over ninety percent of the
stock that it wishes to acquire, it may simply “freeze out” the minority shareholders, in
return for cash payments. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2013).
169. See David W. Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 153, 184–91 (1986) (discussing tender offers, and noting how they differ
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other, they collectively will be able to get a higher price than if they do not
cooperate. But it is tempting for shareholders not to cooperate. Some of
them may choose to sell their shares before an agreement is reached; if the
bidder obtains a stake of over fifty percent, it may be able to pick up the
remainder at a lower price.170 And some shareholders may renege from the
agreement at the last moment by refusing to tender their shares; they may
be able to extract a higher price than their fellow shareholders.
Three mechanisms prohibit such behavior and “solve” the dilemma.
The first is the Williams Act, which regulates tender offers.171 Under the
Williams Act, it is not possible for a bidder to make incremental tender
offers by first offering a low price, at which some shareholders tender their
shares, and then offering a higher price, at which more shareholders tender,
until the bidder has acquired the total number required. Instead, the bidder
must offer the later, higher price to all bidders.172
The second mechanism is corporate law, which has set down
standards for tender offers. If a bidder that owns more than fifty percent of
the stock of a company wishes to acquire the remainder that it does not
own via a tender offer and then a “freeze-out,” it must agree to pay in the
freeze-out the same price that it offered in the tender offer.173 On the other
hand, if a non-controlling shareholder launches a tender offer, gains over
fifty percent of the target, and then uses a merger to take full control, the
second stage of the transaction is reviewed under an “entire fairness”
standard, which ensures that those shareholders who do not tender their
shares are paid a fair price.174
from typical prisoner’s dilemmas).
170. See id. at 163 n.41 (hypothesizing a world without state appraisal statutes, in which
coercive tender offer structures could induce a shareholder to tender where he or she would
not otherwise, in order to maximize the minimum amount the shareholder will receive).
171. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (adding new sections 13(d), 13(e)
and 14(d)-(f) (1968) to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f) (2012)).
172. 15 U.S.C § 78n(d)(7) (2006). The Williams Act also mandates a minimum
offering time for a tender offer, which makes it possible for competitors to challenge the
offer. Unlawful Tender Offer Practices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a) (2012); Leebron, supra
note 169, at 185 n.111.
173. See In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 445 (Del. Ch. 2002)
(holding that a controlling shareholder’s tender offer for the company’s remaining shares is
only considered non-coercive if the shareholder agrees to “freeze out” the non-tendering
shareholders at the same price once it obtains more than 90% of the shares).
174. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994) (holding
that “entire fairness” is the appropriate standard in a merger consummated by a controlling
shareholder). The entire fairness standard implicates both “fair dealing and fair price.” Id.
at 1115 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983)). Of these two,
fair price is generally the more important one. See, e.g., Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs.,
P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 311 (Del. Ch. 2006) (noting that the requirement of
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The third mechanism is the “poison pill,” which effectively forces a
bidder to negotiate directly with management rather than directly with
shareholders. The poison pill thus can be seen as correcting an anomaly in
Delaware corporation law under which merger transactions, which lead to a
change of control, require board approval, but tender offers do not.175
Although there are many forms of pills, the most common permit
management to issue new securities if a bidder reaches a certain ownership
stake in the target, or grant the target shareholders the right to buy shares in
the acquiring company.176 This makes it very expensive, or impossible, for
a bidder to take over a company with a pill without the approval of the
management, who speak for all the shareholders.177
These three mechanisms have the effect of solving the shareholder’s
dilemma. Instead of competing with each other, shareholders are forced to
cooperate with each other. This behavior, however, might be illegal in
other contexts; as noted above, if the good being sold was not stock but
widgets, such collusive behavior would be prohibited by the Sherman
Act.178 Collusion between shareholders in responding to tender offers is, it
has been claimed, “deeply problematic from the antitrust perspective,” and
corporate law appears to be in conflict with antitrust law.179
Various arguments have been put forward in support of this
proposition, and I shall take the two most salient.180 First, collusion cannot
procedural and substantive fairness “is more than a bit of a misnomer, as the overriding
consideration is whether the substantive terms of the transaction were fair”).
175. See Air Prods. & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, 16 A.3d 48, 94–95 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(pointing out the anomaly in Delaware corporation law and noting that the poison pill was
created as an attempt to address this flaw).
176. Brian J. McTear, Comment, Has the Evolution of the Poison Pill Come to an
End?—Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc.; Mentor Graphics, Inc. v. Quickturn Design Systems,
Inc., 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 881, 884–85 (1999).
177. Courts differ on how difficult a poison pill may make a takeover while still being
permissible under Delaware law. Compare Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1
A.3d 310, 337 n.182 (Del. Ch. 2010) (holding that an acceptable defensive measure should
“leave a proxy insurgent with a fair chance for victory . . . .”), with Selectica, Inc. v. Versata
Enters., Inc., C.A. No. 4241-VCN, 2010 WL 703062, at *20 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2010)
(applying a stricter standard and holding that, for a pill to be impermissible, the chance of
defeating the defensive measure must be “‘mathematically impossible’ or ‘realistically
unattainable.’”) (quoting Carmody v. Toll Bros., 732 A.2d 1180, 1195 (Del. Ch. 1998)).
178. Rock, Antitrust Lens, supra note 10, at 544–45.
179. Id. at 544.
180. These arguments are, like much else in this Article, drawn from Professor Rock’s
work. See id. I only discuss two of Professor Rock’s five arguments on this point. First, I
pass over his argument based on “allocational efficiency.” This argument recognizes that
joint bargaining by shareholders may be beneficial because, if shareholders were not able to
force bidders to buy them out at a higher price by colluding, they would be less likely to
invest in the corporation in the first place—which would lead to suboptimal amounts of
investment. Id. at 540. I pass over this argument because although Rock recognizes its
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be defended on the grounds that the shareholders are all co-owners; acting
as co-owners “does not provide any sort of blanket license for engaging in
concerted activities.”181 Second, despite the fact that small shareholders
can be “frozen out,” they should not be permitted to bargain jointly.182 The
position of shareholders can be analogized to that of unitholders in oil
unitization fields. Unitholders would likely not be permitted to bargain
jointly to sell their units—and so why should shareholders?183
The first argument is particularly worthy of examination: The
contention that collusion between shareholders cannot be justified on
grounds of co-ownership appears dubious. Collusion between shareholders
as co-owners is a form of joint bargaining, and thus functions as a
horizontal restraint. The Court’s jurisprudence on joint bargaining is not
extensive: It has only investigated such agreements once since the 1930s.
However, it has found that joint sales agreements are subject to the rule of
reason.184 The question is therefore whether it is procompetitive or
validity, he notes that there is insufficient empirical evidence to evaluate it. Second, I pass
over Rock’s “populist” or “distributional” argument, that sellers are no weaker than buyers
and do not deserve an exemption from the antitrust law. Id. at 542. I leave this argument
aside because I am approaching this question from the opposite direction to Rock, and it is
not an affirmative argument that sellers of stock should not be allowed to cooperate. Third,
I pass over Rock’s “doctrinal” argument, which is that the Williams Act should not be seen
as repealing the Sherman Act in the market for corporate control. Id. at 544. I do not deal
with this argument because I am trying to establish that antitrust law need not be involved in
the market for corporate control, not that it is impossible for antitrust law to operate in this
space.
181. Id. at 533. Rock relied for support here on the case of NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468
U.S. 85 (1984), in which the Court held that the National College Athletic Association had
violated the Sherman and Clayton Acts by restricting college football teams from
negotiating their own television rights agreements with broadcasters. The Court used NCAA
in its unanimous ruling in American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (2010), when it
held that collective licensing agreements by teams that made up the National Football
League breached section 1 of the Sherman Act.
182. Id. at 533.
183. Id. at 536–37.
184. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). Broadcast Music held that
record companies, composers and musicians were permitted to license the copyright for
their works through agencies that negotiated on behalf of their members as a group. The
previous time when the Court had examined a joint sales agreement was Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States, in which it held that it was legal for coal producers east of the
Mississippi to form an agency to achieve “the best prices obtainable and, if all [the coal]
cannot be sold, to apportion orders upon a stated basis.” 288 U.S. 344, 358 (1933).
Broadcast Music relied directly on a modern conception of the “rule of reason”: on remand,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was directed to “include [in its analysis] an assessment
under the rule of reason of the blanket license as employed in the television industry . . . .”
Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 24–25. The rationale of Appalachian Coals can be squared with
that used in Broadcast Music, but only just. Chief Justice Hughes, for the majority, wrote
that “[t]he mere fact that the parties to an agreement eliminate competition between
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anticompetitive for shareholders to collude with each other.
It has been argued that it is efficient for shareholders to collude when
they act as co-owners—for example, when they wish to monitor the
management board.185 On the other hand, when they are considering
whether to sell their shares, they act as competitors—and there is no
economic justification why they should cooperate. But this analysis,
although tempting, is not ironclad. The division between shareholders as
“co-owners” and “competitors” is not so precise.
Shareholders in public companies usually do not see themselves as
being either a “holder” of stock, or a “seller,” as the above analysis implies.
It is true that in some circumstances, shareholders may be determined to
sell the corporation (if it is facing bankruptcy, for example), and in others
the shareholders may be intent on keeping it (for example, if it is a familycontrolled business). However, many shareholders will be happy to sell
their stock if the price is high enough, or to keep it if that is the financially
more attractive option.186 Like members in any organization, shareholders
are faced with the continual question of whether they should keep their
membership or “exit” from it.187 Seen like this, the decision to cash out an
investment in a firm is qualitatively no different from any other decision
that shareholders may take collectively as “co-owners.” If shareholders
may combine to elect management as part of their efforts to achieve a
return on their investment, it is hard to see why they also may not cooperate
in making decisions whether to sell the company to achieve a return. This
argument is particularly forceful when we recall that one of the benefits of
shareholder cooperation may be to defeat potentially anticompetitive

themselves is not enough to condemn it.” Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 260. However,
the overwhelming tone of the opinion is not one of economic analysis, but concern for the
social conditions produced by “injurious and destructive [trade] practices.”
Id.
Appalachian Coals is therefore of dubious authority, and part of its holding in another
context has been overruled. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771
(1984) (holding, contrary to Appalachian Coals, that a parent and its subsidiary must be
seen as a single enterprise for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act).
185. Rock, Antitrust Lens, supra note 10, at 533.
186. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (postulating
that the only utility gained by shareholders from ownership in a company is the positive
effect that it has on their wealth and cash flow).
187. This was pointed out most famously by Albert Hirschman in 1970. ALBERT O.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS,
AND STATES 46 (1970). The shareholder is faced with the continual question of whether he
should retain his shareholding, or sell it. Id.; see also John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking
Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds,
120 YALE L.J. 84 (2010) (discussing this framework as applied to mutual fund
shareholders).
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practices among sellers.188
At a more fundamental level, the contention that fixing the price of
shares of a company in a tender offer can be compared to a cartel of
manufacturers fixing the price of widgets seems mistaken.189 Price-fixing
in a cartel assumes that the entire market (or almost the entire market) is
subject to the cartel; otherwise, the cartel has no effect and would be
destroyed as soon as it had begun. On the other hand, the wide variety of
substitutes available in companies means that the shareholders of one
company, by grouping together, do not have the power to raise prices in the
entire market. If the price of a target company is too high, the acquirer may
bid for another company instead.190 And although it is true that if every
company in a given sector adopts a poison pill or another device that raises
the price that must be paid for the company, there is still a competitive
market for corporate control. This competitive market could only be
defeated if shareholders in different companies were to collude to fix the
prices of their shares—a situation that is almost inconceivable.
The second argument outlined above, in my view, is less persuasive.
According to this argument, selling shareholders are in a better position
than unitholders in oil fields, because the freezeout rule solves the “free
rider” and the “holdout” problems caused by shareholders who refuse to
tender.191 Because shareholders are in a better position than unitholders,
the fact that they can be “frozen out” does not mean that they should be
permitted to undertake collective bargaining activities that unitholders
cannot. But the rules for oil unitization fields in fact place unitholders in a
situation that is remarkably similar to that of shareholders who are the
subject of freezeouts. There is no restriction on collective bargaining by oil
unitholders to obtain a better price, but the force of this collective
bargaining is weakened by the fact that it is usually only necessary for an
oil extractor to obtain consents from a supermajority of unitholders in order

188. See supra note 159 (arguing that the practice of shareholder collusion in tender
offers is in fact procompetitive, not anticompetitive).
189. Rock, Antitrust Lens, supra note 10, at 527.
190. Rock responds to this point by arguing that “collectively shareholders do in fact
possess market power, within what one might characterize as the submarket for the shares of
a given target.” Id. at 529 (emphasis added). This seems rather unlikely: There are usually
many substitutes available for any given company. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Joe Bankman,
Substitutes for Insider Trading, 54 STAN. L. REV. 235 (2001) (noting that it may be possible
to replicate the effects of insider trading by trading in “stock substitutes”); Amanda M. Rose
& Richard Squire, Intraportfolio Litigation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1679 (2011) (noting that
shareholders of one corporation are likely to be diversified and hold stock in rival
corporations).
191. Rock, Antitrust Lens, supra note 10, at 536.
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to proceed with the extraction.192 Once the extractor has obtained consents
from a supermajority, it is permitted effectively to “freeze out” the
remaining unitholders and pay them royalties for the extraction of their
resources.193 Therefore, the freezeout rule places shareholders in a similar
position as unitholders. For these reasons, it does not seem that corporate
shareholders get any kind of “special treatment” compared to those who are
subject to antitrust law, and we should therefore not conclude that there is a
conflict between antitrust and corporate law in the field of tender offers.
C. Constituency Statutes
State takeover statutes and constituency statutes are other examples of
where corporate law appears to violate federal antitrust law. I treat these
two types of statutes together because constituency statutes can be seen as a
form of takeover statute.194
The “first generation” of state takeover statutes was developed in the
1970s. States sought to intervene in takeovers for domestic companies in
order to protect local management.195 The definition of “domestic
company” was extremely broad: For example, Illinois’s statute covered not
only companies incorporated within the state, but any company of which
ten percent of the shareholders were located in Illinois, or which had a
main office in the state and had ten percent of its capital and surplus
represented within the state.196 A corporation could thus be incorporated
within another state, and conduct almost all of its business in other states,
yet be subject to Illinois’s laws. The takeover statutes required bidders to
submit plans to a state agency and get approval before proceeding with a
bid; because state review was so protracted, management was put in a
strong position to resist the takeover.197
It is unsurprising that these statutes were challenged as burdening
interstate commerce. In the case that struck down the first generation of
takeover statutes, Edgar v. MITE Corp., the Court held that Illinois was

192. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.4 (2010). I cite the example of Oklahoma
because it was the first state to adopt an oil unitization statute.
193. Id.
194. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race
To Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1179 (1999).
195. ROMANO, supra note 117, at 54.
196. See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 627 (1982) (defining a “target company”
and a registered offer under the Illinois statute).
197. ROMANO, supra note 117, at 54; see also Edgar, 457 U.S. at 627 (describing
procedure instituted by Illinois’s takeover law).
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placing an unwarranted burden on out-of-state transactions.198 Illinois had
a legitimate interest in protecting resident shareholders, but had no such
legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders.199
States
responded to Edgar by producing a “second generation” of takeover
statutes that had narrower bases of jurisdiction, less sweeping
extraterritorial reach, and were modeled as state regulation of corporate
governance.200 These statutes have various forms. The most common type,
“control share acquisition statutes,” provide that a bidder who acquires a
controlling stake in a corporation is not permitted to vote those shares
unless a majority of the other (non-controlling) shareholders permits it to.201
Other statutes provide that a party has to pay a “fair price,” dictated by
statute, in a merger where the party already owns a significant proportion
of the target company, while still others prevent a bidder from engaging in
a business combination with an acquired company for a certain period of
time.202 The constitutionality of such statutes was upheld in 1987, in CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.203 Delaware adopted its own takeover statute the
following year.204
Finally, states adopted constituency statutes, discussed above. These
allow directors to consider the interests of non-shareholders in exercising
their authority as to whether or not to accept a bid for a company. Scholars
have pointed out that they give managers “an even greater ability to
formulate a legally acceptable reason not to dismantle a poison pill or
refrain from whatever other defensive maneuvers they might wish to
engage in.”205 Constituency statutes, along with takeover statutes, make it
harder for bidders to acquire target companies in a hostile takeover.
Because of their operation, takeover statutes and constituency statutes
can be seen as posing problems under the antitrust laws. Control share
acquisition statutes and constituency statutes in particular present the same
problem as poison pills: They force a potential bidder to negotiate directly
with the directors of a company, and not with individual shareholders.
Because the directors are elected by all the shareholders, these laws can be

198. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 644.
199. Id.
200. William C. Tyson, The Proper Relationship Between Federal and State Law in the
Regulation of Tender Offers, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 241, 247 (1990).
201. Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 194, at 1178.
202. Id. at 1178.
203. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
204. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2012); see Guhan Subramanian et al., Is Delaware’s
Antitakeover Statute Unconstitutional? Evidence from 1988-2008, 65 BUS. LAW. 685, 69498 (2010) (describing the background of legislative action of the Delaware bar to design an
antitakeover statute that would survive constitutional challenge).
205. Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 194, at 1180.
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seen as creating a cartel of shareholders who bargain jointly rather than in
competition with each other. Under antitrust law, this could be considered
illegal.
These laws are saved, however, under the Parker doctrine, which
provides one of the exemptions to the nation’s federal antitrust laws. The
doctrine holds that “when a state acting in its sovereign capacity announces
a public policy against free competition in a privately owned industry, then
state control and regulation thereof, even to the extent of eliminating
competition, is permissible . . . .”206 The doctrine was named after the case
of Parker v. Brown, in which the appellee challenged the right of California
to pass regulations concerning the marketing of raisins that would force
prices up and enrich farmers.207 The Court, in upholding the Californian
regulation, held that there was no violation of the Sherman Act: “The state
in adopting and enforcing the [marketing and distribution] program made
no contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of
trade or to establish monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an
act of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit.”208
This was entirely correct—but, as scholars have pointed out, was not
the question that the Parker Court was asked.209 Brown, a farmer of
raisins, had claimed in the lower court that California’s regulation was
preempted under the dormant Commerce Clause.210 The Supreme Court,
taking a direct appeal from the three-judge district court, requested
additional briefing on the question of whether the California regulation
violated the Sherman Act.211 In the event, the Court found that there was
no Sherman Act violation, and ignored the preemption question
altogether.212

206. LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, 1 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION,
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 4:4 (4th ed. 2011).
207. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
208. Id. at 352.
209. See, e.g., Richard Squire, Antitrust and the Supremacy Clause, 59 STAN. L. REV.
77, 81-82 (2006) (arguing that the only question in Parker was whether federal law
preempted state regulation).
210. Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895, 896 (1941).
211. Squire, supra note 209, at 82.
212. This was observed by three dissenting Justices some thirty years later, in Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). See id. at 618 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In Cantor,
the petitioner had sued Detroit Edison, a monopoly provider of electricity that provided
power to southeastern Michigan, for violating the antitrust laws through its practice of
handing out replacement light bulbs to customers free of charge. This “tying” arrangement
could not be changed without the approval of the state of Michigan: The distribution of
light bulbs was approved by the state Public Service Commission, and the cost of the
replacement light bulbs was included in the electricity rates, which could only be changed
with state permission. Id. at 582–83.
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Nevertheless, courts have continued to treat the question of state
Sherman Act violations and preemption under the Commerce Clause as one
and the same. The Court articulated the state action doctrine in its current
form in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc.213 The appellee, Midcal, was a wine wholesaler that wished to sell
wine for prices lower than those posted on schedules by state wine
producers, in contravention of state regulation.214 The Court laid down two
requirements for state action to receive immunity under the Parker
doctrine: The “challenged restraint must be ‘one clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy,’” and “the policy must be ‘actively
supervised’ by the State itself.”215
The Parker doctrine protects state takeover statutes from antitrust law.
State takeover laws are “clearly not prohibited by the Sherman Act.”216
The logic of the Parker doctrine has been challenged.217 However, the
result—in the market for corporate control, at least—is not objectionable.
In the case of takeover statutes, corporations may often choose to opt out of
the takeover statute altogether,218 and shareholders who are unhappy with
their corporation’s use of a state takeover statute may even force the
corporation to reincorporate in a state with a less stringent statute.219
Delaware’s statute has not had a significant effect on preventing changes in
control, and it is highly dubious that any federal regulation is required.220
IV. ANTITRUST LAW STEPPING IN: THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO ACT
The discussion above argued that, in three areas, the market for

213. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
214. Id. at 99–100.
215. Id. at 105.
216. Rock, Antitrust Lens, supra note 10, at 558.
217. E.g., Squire, supra note 209 (arguing that the Supreme Court has confused whether
market conduct encouraged by state law violates the Sherman Act, and whether state law
conflicts with the Sherman Act and is thus pre-empted); Dirk C. Phillips, Note, Putting
Parker v. Brown and Its Progeny in Perspective: An Assessment of the Supreme Court’s
Role in Development of Antitrust Federalism, 16 J. L. & POL. 193 (2000) (examining
jurisprudence in wake of the Parker decision).
218. See Springer, supra 84, at 101–02 (detailing opt-in and opt-out provisions).
219. ROMANO, supra note 117, at 57. Moving states does not guarantee that hostile
bidders will be able to overcome the takeover statute. See Subramanian et al., supra note
204 (showing that, in twenty years, no hostile bidder had managed to overcome the hurdles
imposed by Delaware’s takeover statute). However, shareholders may be able to force the
corporation to opt out of it.
220. Subramanian et al., supra note 204, at 705 (noting that poison pill is a much more
important defense to hostile bids for Delaware corporations than section 203).
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corporate control is functioning adequately without antitrust law. I now
move to a final area, where it has been necessary for antitrust law to step in.
This is merger activity regulated by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR).
A. The Effect of HSR
HSR was enacted in 1976. At this time, the Court was beginning to
apply the principles of the Chicago school to its jurisprudence, which
focused on economic efficiency rather than a doctrinal approach that “big is
bad.”221 The economy was also becoming globalized, reducing the force of
the populist appeal for small companies over large, and HSR can be seen as
a backlash against this.222 HSR was divided into three titles. The first title
was “Antitrust Civil Process Act Amendments;” the second, “Premerger
Notification;” and the third, “Parens Patriae.”223 Of these, it is the second
title that is the focus of the following discussion.
The premerger notification requirement mandates that, provided that
the transaction or either the acquirer or acquired corporation is of a certain
size, the parties must inform the Federal Trade Commission and the
Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice of the
transaction.224 The parties must then wait to obtain antitrust approval: This
waiting period is thirty days long (fifteen days in the case of a cash tender
offer), although it may be shortened if the FTC and DOJ determine that
they do not wish to take any action in respect of the transaction, and may
be lengthened if they decide that they need more time. 225 There are also
various exceptions to the waiting requirement.226
The waiting period, and its exceptions, are examples of antitrust law

221. Sims & Harman, supra note 70, at 872.
222. Id. at 872–76.
223. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90
Stat. 1383, 1383, 1390, 1394 (1976).
224. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a), (d) (2006). The requirements for the merger notification are
somewhat complex. The acquirer must file if the total transaction is worth more than
$283.6 million.
Id. § 18a(a)(2)(A) (2006); 78 Fed. Reg. 2406 (Jan. 11, 2013).
Alternatively, the acquirer must file if a transaction is worth $70.9 million, and either (i) the
acquirer has annual net sales or assets greater than $141.8 million, and the acquired stock or
assets are of a manufacturing enterprise that has net sales or assets greater than $14.2
million; or (ii) the acquirer has annual net sales or assets greater than $141.8 million, and the
acquired assets are of a non-manufacturing enterprise that has total assets greater than $14.2
million; or (iii) any voting securities of a person with annual net sales or total assets of
$141.8 million are being acquired by a person with total assets or net sales of at least $14.2
million. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(2)(B) (2006); 78 Fed. Reg. 2406 (Jan. 11, 2013).
225. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b), (e)(2) (2006).
226. Id. § 18a(c).
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affecting corporate law. The effect of the HSR waiting period is to make it
harder for bidders to acquire companies quickly and discreetly; any
sizeable transaction will need to be reported to the authorities. This makes
it easier for a competing bidder to attempt to “jump” the deal and make its
own bid.227 There is evidence that HSR has reduced the frequency of
takeover bids; bidders are worried that they will fail to win their target, and
so decline to go to the expense of bidding at all.228 At the same time,
premiums received by shareholders on account of these waiting periods
have not necessarily increased.229 In this way, HSR can be seen as cutting
across the goals of corporate law. Corporate law aims at maximizing the
value received by shareholders for their stock.230 HSR makes it less likely
that a bidder will attempt to buy the shareholders’ stock, and does not
compensate for this with an increase in the consideration offered if the
bidder does decide to bid.
HSR contains twelve exceptions to the waiting period.231 These cover
a range of transactions, such as “acquisitions of goods or realty transferred
in the ordinary course of business,” and various kinds of acquisitions that
are aimed at passive investment rather than active control.232 One of these
exceptions is particularly relevant. “[A]cquisitions of voting securities of
an issuer at least 50 per centum of the voting securities of which are owned
by the acquiring person prior to such acquisition” are exempted from HartScott-Rodino.233 Under this exception, an acquirer that already has a
majority stake in a corporation is able to squeeze out minority shareholders
without causing antitrust concerns.
B. Assessing HSR Alongside Corporate Law
Given this Article’s proposition for the correct interaction between
antitrust and corporate law, what should we make of HSR? The waiting
period that is mandated in certain circumstances by HSR interferes with the
management of corporations and affects how likely a company is to bid for
another corporation. However, the waiting period is designed to prevent a
227. See Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9
YALE J. ON REG. 119, 156 (1992) (“Any regulation that delays the consummation of a hostile
bid, for example, increases the likelihood of an auction by providing time for another bidder
to enter the fray, upon the target’s solicitation or otherwise.”).
228. Id. at 178.
229. Id.
230. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
231. 15 U.S.C. § 18(c) (2006).
232. Id. § 18(c)(1), (2).
233. Id. § 18(c)(3).
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worse evil: The need to “unscramble” a consummated merger transaction.
The proponents of HSR noted that it was “difficult at best, and frequently
impossible” to reverse such transactions.234 This fact both reflected the
business realities of trying to disentangle two combined enterprises, and the
fact that courts before the passage of HSR were reluctant to order the
break-up of newly combined firms.235 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act can thus
be seen as a necessary response to a problem that corporate law could not
solve on its own. In this regard, HSR is similar to the Sherman Act,
described above: It corrects for a failure in state corporate law.236
HSR takes a consciously transaction-focused approach: It interferes
with certain classes of transactions that firms undertake. This is more
successful than a “market-based” approach, which is effectively what
existed before HSR was enacted, and is what provided the stimulus for
HSR.237 This approach led to long delays because it engendered litigation
and did not have the certainty of HSR’s bright-line rules.238 In the
particularly notorious El Paso case, it took seven years of litigation before
the Supreme Court ordered the acquiring company to divest itself of the
target company, and then another ten before the divestiture actually
occurred.239 Clearly, a bright-line rule has benefits.
Nevertheless, HSR should still avoid as much as possible distorting
the market for corporate control. Ironically, the exemptions to HSR risk
are causing this distortion. By excluding certain kinds of transactions that
are not considered problematic from HSR’s scope, they risk
disproportionately encouraging these transactions over others.
The squeeze-out exception is a case in point. On its face, it makes
sense. The acquirer already has majority control; it already has the voting
power to cause the target company to collude with it and act in an anti-

234. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1373, at 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 264041.
235. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J.L. &
ECON. 43 (1969) (noting that, in the decade between 1950 and 1960, the government only
managed to undo the effect of ten out of eighty-one mergers that it challenged under the
Celler-Kefauver Act). Corporate law courts have also recognized the difficulties inherent in
trying to unscramble takeovers. See, e.g., Coggins v. New Eng. Patriots Football Club, Inc.,
492 N.E.2d 1112, 1119 (Mass. 1986) (noting that appropriate relief granted for
impermissible merger is usually rescission, but that specific performance may be impossible
in some instances).
236. See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
237. William J. Baer, Reflections on Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement Under the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 825, 826–28 (1997).
238. See Easterbrook, supra note 67 (noting the difficulty that judges have in applying
flexible tests).
239. See Baer, supra note 237 (citing United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376
U.S. 651 (1964)).
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competitive manner. The increase in shareholding, therefore, should make
no change to the behavior of the controlled company. However, corporate
law differs on this point. Just because a parent company has a majority
stake in, and controls, a subsidiary does not mean that the parent can run
the subsidiary in such a way as to benefit it and harm the subsidiary’s
minority shareholders. The directors of a corporation owe a fiduciary duty
to all the shareholders of a corporation, not just the majority
shareholders.240
The squeeze-out exception does not create a conflict between antitrust
and corporate law. But the two bodies of law seem incoherent. A
shareholder is typically reckoned to have a controlling stake in a
corporation when its shareholding reaches about thirty percent.241 Despite
this, HSR approval is required for acquisitions of stakes much smaller than
thirty percent, provided that they reach the bar above; but approval is not
required when a corporation wants to close out a minority stake in order to
take a subsidiary private.
This type of HSR review for transactions in which a shareholder
increases its already-controlling stake appears to function more like the
disclosure requirements of section 13(d) of the Williams Act, which
requires any person who obtains more than five percent of a class of
securities registered under the Exchange Act to file a beneficial ownership
report with the SEC.242 This provision of HSR thus imitates a feature of
federal securities law that is an integral part of the broader corporate law
regime. But, because the shareholder already has a controlling stake, HSR
review seems to add little value. Furthermore, HSR review at this level

240. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (stating that where
majority shareholder ran a corporation to benefit itself rather than the entirety of the
corporation’s shareholders, that majority-minority relationship was potentially subject to
increased scrutiny, in order to confirm intrinsic fairness of dealing).
241. This explains various aspects of takeover codes and accounting regulations. In the
United Kingdom, for example, a bidder who obtains a thirty percent in a company is obliged
to offer to bid for the remaining shares, as the other shareholders are deemed minority
shareholders. John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile
Takeovers, and Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95
GEO. L.J. 1727, 1763–64 (2007). In accounting, corporations may be obliged to consolidate
the accounts of a subsidiary on their balance sheet if they have between twenty and fifty
percent of the stock. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 35:
CRITERIA FOR APPLYING THE EQUITY METHOD OF ACCOUNTING FOR INVESTMENTS IN
COMMON STOCK (1981), available at http://www.gasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&
blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175820931007&blobheader=applicatio
n%2Fpdf. Cf. Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 359–60 (Del. Ch.
2010) (noting that a shareholder that has a stake greater than 20% in a company may be able
to form a control bloc).
242. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006).
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potentially has a distorting effect on investments. Small purchases are
closely scrutinized: An acquirer that wishes to take an initial five percent
stake in a target may need to wait for approval. If a shareholder has a
controlling stake of thirty-five pecent and wishes to raise it to forty percent,
it may still need to wait. But if the shareholder has a stake of fifty percent
and wishes to increase it further, it will not have to wait. At the margin,
this discourages shareholders from investing until their stake reaches the
magic—but, in terms of control, unimportant—number of fifty percent.
The squeeze-out exception creates a tension with corporate law: This
illustrates the risks of antitrust law regulating the market for corporate
control by seeking to regulate certain transactions firms may carry out.
CONCLUSION
Professor Rock noted: “Antitrust is about markets; corporate law is
about firms.”243 He then argued that this separation was unwarranted. This
Article has suggested a different view: Antitrust law should only operate in
the market for corporate control when there is a market dysfunction that
corporate law cannot fix on its own. By and large, antitrust law, with its
market-based approach, and corporate law, with its firm-based focus,
coexist successfully. Antitrust law only interferes in the market for
corporate control, as in the case of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, when there
is a problem in the market for corporate control that corporate law cannot
solve.
The role of antitrust law in the market for corporate control is
currently being litigated in Dahl v. Bain Capital.244 Notwithstanding the
allegations in that case, this Article has argued that corporate law already
has tools to ensure a competitive market for corporate control. This Article
has identified one minor instance—the squeeze-out exception to HSR—in
which antitrust law takes a transaction-based approach, and overlaps with
corporate law in a way that does not appear to serve a useful purpose. This
exception should be fixed; but, in the main, antitrust law and corporate law
are coexisting well.

243. Rock, Antitrust Lens, supra note 10, at 498.
244. 589 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Mass. 2008); see supra note 13 (denying private equity
funds’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis that the pleadings sufficiently alleged a
Sherman Act claim).

